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Commercial  paper  is  a  short-term  unsecured  prom- 
issory  note  that  is  generally  sold  by  large  corpora- 
tions  on  a discount  basis  to  institutional  investors  and 
to  other  corporations.  Since  commercial  paper  is 
unsecured  and  bears  only  the  name  of  the  issuer,  the 
market  has  generally  been  dominated  by  large  cor- 
porations  with  the  highest  credit  ratings.  In  recent 
years  commercial  paper  has  attracted  much  attention 
because  of  its  rapid  growth  and  its  use  as  an  alter- 
native  to  short-term  bank  loans.  The  number  of 
firms  issuing  commercial  paper  rose  from  slightly 
over  300  in  1965  to  about  1,000  in  1980.  Moreover, 
the  outstanding  volume  of  commercial  paper  in- 
creased  at  an  annual  rate  of  12.4  percent  during  the 
1970s  to  a  level  of  $123  billion  in  June  1980.  This 
article  describes  the  commercial  paper  market,  focus- 
ing  primarily  on  the  1970s,  the  period  of  greatest 
change  and  growth. 
Market  Characteristics  The  principal  issuers  of 
commercial  paper  include  finance  companies,  nonfi- 
nancial  companies,  and  bank  holding  companies. 
These  issuers  participate  in  the  market  for  different 
reasons  and  in’  different  ways.  Finance  companies 
raise  funds  on  a  more-or-less  continuous  basis  in  the 
commercial  paper  market  to  support  their  consumer 
and  business  lending.  These  commercial  paper  sales 
in  part  provide  interim  financing  between  issues  of 
long-term  debentures.  Nonfinancial  companies  issue 
commercial  paper  at  less  frequent  intervals  than  do 
finance  companies.  These  firms  issue  paper  to  meet 
their  funding  requirements  for  short-term  or  sea- 
sonal  expenditures  such  as  inventories,  payrolls,  and 
tax  liabilities.  Bank  holding  companies  use  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market  to  finance  primarily  banking- 
related  activities  such  as  leasing,  mortgage  banking, 
and  consumer  finance. 
Denominations  and  Maturities  Like  other  instru- 
ments  of  the  money  market,  commercial  paper  is  sold 
to  raise  large  sums  of  money  quickly  and  for  short 
periods  of  time.  Although  sometimes  issued  in  de- 
nominations  as  small  as  $25,000  or  $50,000,  most 
commercial  paper  offerings  are  in  multiples  of 
$100,000.  The  average  purchase  size  of  commercial 
paper  is  about  $2  million.  The  average  issuer  has 
$120  million  in  outstanding  commercial  paper  ;  some 
of  the  largest  issuers  individually  have  several  billion 
dollars  in  outstanding  paper. 
Exemption  from  registration  requirements  with 
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  reduces  the 
time  and  expense  of  readying  an  issue  of  commercial 
paper  for  sale.  Almost  all  outstanding  commercial 
paper  meets  the  conditions  for  exemption,  namely: 
(1)  that  it  have  an  original  maturity  of  no  greater 
than  270  days  and  (2)  that  the  proceeds  be  used  to 
finance  current  transactions.  The  average  maturity 
of  outstanding  commercial  paper  is  under  30  days, 
with  most  paper  falling  within  the  20-  to  45-day 
range. 
Placement  Issuers  place  commercial  paper  with 
investors  either  directly  using  their  own  sales  force 
or  indirectly  using  commercial  paper  dealers.  The 
method  of  placement  depends  primarily  on  the  trans- 
action  costs  of  these  alternatives.  Dealers  generally 
charge  a  one-eighth  of  one  percent  commission  on 
face  value  for  placing  paper.  Therefore,  if  a  firm 
places  $100  million  in  commercial  paper  using  the 
intermediary  services  of  a  dealer,  commissions  would 
cost  $125  thousand.  There  are  six  major  commer- 
cial  paper  dealers. 
Firms  with  an  average  amount  of outstanding  com- 
mercial  paper  of  several  hundred  million  dollars  or 
more  generally  find  it  less  costly  to  maintain  a  sales 
force  and  market  their  commercial  paper  directly. 
Almost  all  direct  issuers  are  large  finance  companies. 
The  short-term  credit  demands  of  nonfinancial  com- 
panies  are  usually  seasonal  or  cyclical  in  nature, 
which  lessens  the  attractiveness  of  establishing  a 
permanent  commercial  paper  sales  staff.  Conse- 
quently,  almost  all  nonfinancial  companies,  including 
large  ones,  rely  on  dealers  to  distribute  their  paper. 
There  is  no  active  secondary  market  in  commercial 
paper.  Dealers  and  direct  issuers  may  redeem  com- 
mercial  paper  before  maturity  if  an  investor  has  an 
urgent  demand  for  funds.  However,  dealers  and 
direct  issuers  discourage  this  practice.  Early  re- 
demptions  of  commercial  paper  rarely  occur  primar- 
ily  because  the  average  maturity  of  commercial  paper 
is  so  short.  One  major  commercial  paper  dealer  esti- 
mates  that  only  about  two  percent  of  their  outstand- 
ing  commercial  paper  is  redeemed  prior  to  maturity. 
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issuing  paper  obtain  ratings  from  at  least  one  of 
three  services,  and  most  obtain  two  ratings.  The 
three  rating  companies  that  grade  commercial  paper 
borrowers  are  Moody’s  Investors  Service,  Standard 
&  Poor’s  Corporation,  and  Fitch  Investor  Service. 
Table  I  shows  the  number  of  companies  rated  by 
Moody’s,  classified  by  industry.  This  table,  covering 
881  issuers,  gives  a  good  indication  of  the  industry 
grouping  of  issuers.  Moody’s  describes  its  ratings 
procedure  as  follows  : 
Moody’s  evaluates  the salient  features  that  affect  a 
commercial  paper  issuer’s  financial  and  competitive 
position.  Our  appraisal  includes,  but  is  not  limited 
to  the  review  of  factors  such  as:  quality  of  man- 
agement,  industry  strengths  and  risks,  vulnera- 
bility  to  business  cycles,  competitive  position,  li- 
quidity  measurements,  debt  structure,  operating 
trends,  and  access  to  capital  markets.  Differing 
weights  are  applied  to  these  factors  as  deemed 
appropriate  for  individual  situations.1 
The  other  rating  services  use  similar  criteria  in  eval- 
uating  issuers.  From  highest  to  lowest  quality,  paper 
ratings  run:  P-l,  P-2,  P-3  for  Moody’s;  A-l,  A-2, 
A-3  for  Standard  &  Poor’s;  and  F-l,  F-2,  F-3  for 
Fitch.  For  all  rating  services  as  of  mid-1980,  the 
average  distribution  of  outstanding  commercial  paper 
for  the  three  quality  gradations  was  about  75  percent 
for  grade  1,  24  percent  for  grade  2,  and  1  percent 
for  grade  3.  As  will  be  discussed  below,  the  differ- 
ence  in  ratings  can  translate  into  considerable  differ- 
ences  in  rates,  particularly  during  periods  of  finan- 
cial  stress. 
The  multifaceted  rating  system  used  by  Moody’s 
reflects  the  heterogeneous  financial  characteristics  of 
commercial  paper.  Paper  of  different  issuers,  even 
with  the  same  quality  rating,  is  not  readily  substitut- 
able.  Consequently,  commercial  paper  tends  to  be 
difficult  to  trade,  and  bid-asked  spreads  on  paper  of  a 
particular  grade  and  maturity  run  a  wide  1/8 of  a 
percentage  point. 
Backup  Lines  of  Credit  In.  most  cases,  issuers 
back  their  paper  100  percent  with  lines  of  credit  from 
commercial  banks.  Even  though  its  average  maturity 
is  very  short,  commercial  paper  still  poses  the  risk 
than  an  issuer  might  not  be  able  to  pay  off  or  roll 
over  maturing  paper.  Consequently,  issuers  use  a 
variety  of  backup  lines  as  insurance  against  periods 
of  financial  stress  or  tight  money.  These  credit  lines 
are  contractual  agreements  that  are  tailored  to  issu- 
1 Sumner  N.  Levin,  ed.,  The  1979  DOW  Jones-Irwin 
Business  Almanac  (Homewood,  Ill.:  Dow  Jones-Irwin, 
1979),  pp.  256-57. 
Table  I 
INDUSTRY  GROUPING  OF  COMMERCIAL  PAPER 
ISSUERS RATED BY MOODY‘S 
November  3,  1980 
Industry  Grouping 
Industrial 
Public  Utilities 
Finance 
Bank  Holding 




of  Firms 
Rated 
Percentage 
of  Total 
Firms  Rated 
370  42.0 
193  21.9 
155  17.6 
119  13.6 
9  1.0 
25  2.8 
10  1.1 
Total  881 
Source:  Moody’s  Bond  Survey,  Annual  Review. 
100.0 
ers’  needs.  Standard  credit  line  agreements  allow 
commercial  paper  issuers  to  borrow  under  a  90-day 
note.  Swing  lines  provide  funds  over  very  short 
periods,  often  to  cover  a  shortfall  in  the  actual  pro- 
ceeds  of  paper  issued  on  a  particular  day.  Revolving 
lines  of  credit  establish  credit  sources  that  are  avail- 
able  over  longer  periods  of  time,  usually  several 
years. 
Noninterest  Costs  of  Issuing  Commercial  Paper 
There  are  three  major  noninterest  costs  associated 
with  commercial  paper  :  ( 1)  backup  lines  of  credit, 
(2)  fees  to  commercial  banks,  and  (3)  rating  ser- 
vices  fees.  Payment  for  backup  lines  is  usually  made 
in  the  form  of  compensating  balances,  which  gener- 
ally  equal  about  10  percent  of  total  credit  lines  ex- 
tended  plus  20  percent  of  credit  lines  activated. 
Instead  of  compensating  balances,  issuers  sometimes 
pay  straight  fees  ranging  from  3/8 to  3/4 percent  of  the 
line  of credit;  this  explicit  pricing  procedure  has  been 
gaining  acceptance  in  recent  years.  Another  cost 
associated  with  issuing  commercial  paper  is  fees 
paid  to  the  large  commercial  banks  that  act  as  issuing 
and  paying  agents  for  the  paper  issuers.  These 
commercial  banks  handle  the  paper  work  involved  in 
issuing  commercial  paper  and  collect  the  proceeds 
from  an  issue  to  pay  off  or  roll  over  a maturing  issue. 
Finally,  rating  services  charge  fees  ranging  from 
$5,000  to  $25,000  per  year  to  provide  ratings  for 
issuers.  Foreign  issuers  pay  from  $3,500  to  $10,000 
per  year  more  for  ratings,  depending  on  the  rating 
service. 
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money  center  banks,  nonfinancial  firms,  investment 
firms,  state  and  local  governments,  private  pension 
funds,  foundations,  and  individuals.  In  addition, 
savings  and  loan  associations  and  mutual  savings 
banks  have  recently  been  granted  authority  to  invest 
up  to  20  percent  of  their  assets  in  commercial  paper. 
These  groups  may  buy  commercial  paper  from  deal- 
ers  or  directly  from  issuers,  or  they  may  buy  shares 
in  short-term  investment  pools  that  include  commer- 
cial  paper.  Except  for  scattered  statistics,  the  dis- 
tribution  of  commercial  paper  held  by  the  various 
investor  groups  is  not  precisely  known.  At  year-end 
1979  all  manufacturing,  mining,  and  trade  corpora- 
tions  held  outright  over  $11  billion  in  commercial 
paper.  A  substantial  but  undocumented  amount  is 
held  by  utilities,  communications,  and  service  com- 
panies.  Commercial  banks  held  approximately  $5 
billion  in  their  loan  portfolios,  while  insurance  com- 
panies  had  about  $9  billion.  Much  commercial  paper, 
about  one-third  of  the  total  amount  outstanding  or 
$40  billion,  is  held  indirectly  through  short-term 
investment  pools,  such  as  money  market  funds  and 
short-term  investment  funds  operated  by  bank  trust 
departments.  At  year-end  1979,  short-term  invest- 
ment  pools  held  32.5  percent  of  all  outstanding  com- 
mercial  paper. 
History  of  Commercial  Paper  Commercial  paper 
has  a  history  that  extends  back  to  colonial  times, 
prior  to  the  existence  of  a  banking  system  in  Amer- 
ica.  The  precursor  of  commercial  paper  was  the 
domestic  bill  of  exchange,  which  was  used  to  finance 
trade  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century.2  Bills  of  exchange  allowed  the  safe  and 
convenient  transfer  of  funds  and  provided  a  short- 
term  loan  between  the  time  of  purchase  and  payment 
for  goods.  As  financial  intermediation  evolved, 
banks  and  paper  brokers  began  discounting  paper. 
The  supply  of  negotiable  paper  was  held  by  commer- 
cial  banks  or  by  entrepreneurs  investing  surplus 
funds. 
In  marked  contrast  to  today’s  commercial  paper 
market,  firms  that  relied  upon  commercial  paper  in 
earlier  times  were  usually  inferior  credit  risks  that 
could  not  obtain  bank  credit.  Reflecting  this  differ- 
ence  in  credit  risk,  commercial  paper  rates  in  the 
early  nineteenth  century  were  much  higher  than  bank 
lending  rates.  Another  basic  difference  between  the 
early  and  contemporary  commercial  paper  markets 
2 A  bill  of  exchange  is  an  order  written  by  a  seller  in- 
structing  a  buyer  to  pay  the  seller  a  specified  sum  of 
money  on  a  specified  date. 
is  the  type  of  obligation  commercial  paper  repre- 
sented.  Up  until  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  paper 
bore  both  the  names  of  the  buyer  of  goods  (the  com- 
mercial  paper  issuer)  and  the  seller  of  goods  (the 
commercial  paper  drawee),  and  was  issued  in  odd 
denominations  according  to  the  value  of  the  under- 
lying  transaction  being  financed.  Hence,  commercial 
paper  was  called  two-name  because  if  the  issuer 
failed  to  pay  an  investor  upon  maturity  of  his  out- 
standing  paper,  it  became  the  obligation  of  the  draw- 
ee.  As  trade  and  financing  practices  changed  after 
the  Civil  War,  commercial  paper  began  to  be  issued 
extensively  as  one-name  paper,  i.e.,  paper  was  only 
the  issuer’s  obligation.3  Also,  the  face  value  of  the 
paper  was  unrelated  to  a  specific  purchase  or  ship- 
ment  of  goods  and  was  instead  issued  in  round  lot 
denominations. 
From  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century 
until  the  early  twentieth,  commercial  paper  allowed 
borrowers  and  investors  to  take  advantage  of  sub- 
stantial  seasonal  and  more  persistent  interest  rate 
differentials  that  existed  in  different  regions  of  the 
country.  Because  of  the  decentralized  banking  sys- 
tem  that  restricted  individual  banks  to  particular 
states  and  even  localities,  banks  could  not  readily 
exploit  regional  interest  rate  differentials.  However, 
commercial  paper  was  marketed  throughout  the 
country.  Commercial  banks  were  able  to  invest  in 
commercial  paper  issued  in  high  interest  rate  areas. 
Similarly,  firms  could  obtain  funds  more  cheaply  by 
selling  commercial  paper  to  banks  in  low  interest  rate 
areas  instead  of  relying  entirely  on  local  bank  loans.* 
In  the  1920s,  commercial  paper  borrowers  in- 
cluded  manufacturers,  wholesalers,  and  retailers  in  a 
wide  variety  of  product  lines.  There  were  about 
4,400  firms  borrowing  in  the  commercial  paper  mar- 
ket  as  a  seasonal  supplement  to  bank  credit,  which 
was  the  primary  source  of  funds.  Virtually  all  paper 
was  handled  by  dealers.  Finance  companies  emerged 
as  major  commercial  paper  borrowers  as  the  auto- 
mobile  industry,  sales  finance,  and  small-loan  com- 
panies  grew  in  importance.  In  1920,  the  largest 
sales-finance  company,  General  Motors  Acceptance 
Corporation,  began  to  place  its  paper  directly  with 
investors  and  set  maturities  specified  by  investors. 
Other  large  finance  companies  began  direct  place- 
ment  about  a  decade  later. 
3 For  an  extensive  account  of  commercial  paper’s  early 
history,  see  Albert  O.  Greef,  The  Commercial  Paper 
House  in  the  United  States  (Cambridge:  Harvard  Uni- 
versity  Press,  1938),  pp.  3-114. 
4 Greef,  pp. 46, 55, 412-14. 
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of  commercial  paper  outstanding,  which  served  as  a 
secondary  reserve  asset.  Although  no  secondary 
market  existed  in  commercial  paper,  banks  nonethe- 
less  regarded  paper  as  highly  liquid  because  the  im- 
personal  nature  of  the  credit  usually  meant  there 
would  be  no  requests  for  extensions  or  renewals. 
Moreover,  paper  provided  banks  with  an  opportunity 
to  diversify  their  portfolios  by  industry  and  geo- 
graphical  area.  After  1914,  some  categories  of  paper 
became  eligible  far  discount  by  the  Federal  Reserve, 
which  further  increased  commercial  paper’s  liquidity. 
Although  the  volume  of  directly  placed  paper  in- 
creased  during  the  1920s,  the  total  volume  of  paper 
outstanding  declined.  The  outstanding  volume  of 
commercial  paper  fell  precipitously  between  1929  and 
1932  from  $420  million  to  $94  million,  as  the  demand 
for  business  credit  fell  sharply  in  the  Great  Depres- 
sion.  In  addition,  the  number  of  issuers  diminished 
from  several  thousand  to  several  hundred.  From 
1933  to  the  outbreak  of  World  War  II,  the  amount 
of  commercial  paper  outstanding  increased  fairly 
steadily  to  $840  million,  reflecting  improvement  in 
the  general  economy,  the  growing  role  of  consumer 
credit  in  financing  consumer  durables,  and  the  rapid 
rise  of  finance  companies.  Consequently,  by  1941 
commercial  paper  outstanding  had  returned  to  the 
levels  of  the  first  half  of  the  1920s.  There  was  a 
decline  in  outstanding  commercial  paper  from  1941 
to  1945,  however. 
The  immediate  postwar  period  brought  a  resur- 
gence  in  the  commercial  paper  market  and  by  1951 
the  market  recovered  almost  to  its  1920  peak.  The 
market  had  changed  substantially,  however.  On  the 
issuer  side  of  the  market,  directly  placed  paper,  pre- 
dominantly  paper  issued  by  the  three  largest  finance 
companies,  rose  to  about  two-thirds  of  all  paper 
outstanding  by  the  early  1950s  from  about  only  one- 
fifth  at  the  trough  of  the  Great  Depression.  -  On  the 
investor  side,  nonfinancial  corporations  were  now 
beginning  to  invest  liquid  assets  in  commercial  paper 
instead  of  placing  them  strictly  in  demand  deposit 
accounts.  Banks  were  simultaneously  relying  to  a 
much  greater  extent  on  Treasury  securities  as  sec- 
ondary  reserve  assets  and  were  no  longer  the  prin- 
cipal  purchasers  of  commercial  paper. 
Developments  Since  the  Mid-1960s  Two  events 
stimulated  growth  in  commercial  paper  in  the  1960s. 
First,  during  the  last  three  quarters  of  1966,  interest 
rates  rose  above  Regulation  Q  ceilings  on  bank  nego- 
tiable  certificates  of  deposit  (CDs),  making  it  diffi- 
cult  for  banks  to  raise  funds  to  meet  the  strong 
corporate  loan  demand  existing  at  that  time.  With- 
out  sufficient  funds  to  lend,  banks  encouraged  their 
financially  strongest  customers  to  issue  commercial 
paper  and  offered  back-up  lines  of  credit.  Many 
potential  commercial  paper  borrowers  who  formerly 
relied  exclusively  on  bank  short-term  credit  now 
turned  to  the  commercial  paper  market.  Conse- 
quently,  the  annual  growth  rate  of  total  outstanding 
commercial  paper  rose  from  7.8  percent  in  1965  to 
46.6  percent  in  1966. 
Second,  credit  market  tightness  recurred  in  1969 
as  open  market  interest  rates  rose  above  Regulation 
Q  ceilings,  again  boosting  growth  in  commercial 
paper.  Financial  innovation  by  banks  contributed 
to  this  growth.  The  banking  system  sold  commercial 
paper  through  bank  holding  companies,  which  used 
the  funds  to  purchase  part  of  their  subsidiary  banks’ 
loan  portfolios.  This  method  of  financing  new  loans 
resulted  in  rapid  growth  in  bank-related  commercial 
paper  during  late  1969  and  early  1970,  as  is  seen  in 
Chart  1.  The  annual  growth  rate  of  total  outstanding 
commercial  paper  more  than  doubled  to  54.7  percent 
in  1969.  In  August  1970,  the  Federal  Reserve 
System  imposed  a  reserve  requirement  on  funds 
raised  in  the  commercial  paper  market  and  channeled 
to  a  member  bank  by  a  bank  holding  company,  or 
any  of  its  affiliates  or  subsidiaries.5  As  a  result, 
bank  related  commercial  paper  outstanding  plum- 
meted  late  in  1970  and  early  in  1971.  This  episode, 
however,  marked  only  the  beginning  of  bank  use  of 
commercial  paper,  which  would  regain  prominence 
by  the  mid-1970s. 
The Penn Central Crisis  The  commercial  paper 
market  grew  steadily  during  the  1960s.  Only  five 
defaults  occurred  during  this  decade,  the  largest  of 
which  amounted  to  $35  million.  In  1970,  however, 
the  commercial  paper  market  was  rocked  by  Penn 
Central’s  default  on  $82  million  of  its  outstanding 
commercial  paper.  The  default  caused  investors  to 
become  wary  of  commercial  paper  issuers  and  more 
concerned  about  their  credit  worthiness.  In  the 
aftermath  of  the  Penn  Central  default,  many  cor- 
porations  experienced  difficulty  refinancing  their 
maturing  commercial  paper.  Financial  disruption 
was  lessened  due  to  a  Federal  Reserve  action  which 
removed  Regulation  Q  interest  rate  ceilings  on  30- 
to  89-day  CDs  and  temporarily  liberalized  the  dis- 
count  policy  for  member  banks.  These  actions  in- 
sured  that  funds  were  available  from  commercial 
banks  to  provide  alternative  financing  for  corpora- 
tions  having  difficulty  rolling  over  commercial  paper. 
5 See  page  17 and  footnote  6. 
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more  conscious  of  credit  worthiness  and  more  selec- 
tive  in  their  commercial  paper  purchases.  During 
this  period,  the  heightened  concern  over  credit 
worthiness  was  evidenced  by  a  widening  rate  spread 
between  the  financially  strongest  and  weakest  paper 
issuers.  Although  some  paper  had  been  rated  long 
before  the  Penn  Central  crisis,  paper  was  now  rated 
on  a  widespread  basis. 
Interest  Rate  Controls  Wage  and  price  controls 
imposed  during  the  early  1970s  dampened  the 
growth  of  the  commercial  paper  market.  On  Oc- 
tober  15,  1971,  the  Committee  on  Interest  and  Divi- 
dends  (CID)  established  voluntary  restraints  on 
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“administered”  rates,  such  as  the  prime  rate.  No 
restraints  were  placed  on  open,  market  rates,  how- 
ever.  This  policy  triggered  flows  of  funds  between 
controlled  and  uncontrolled  credit  markets  as  the 
relationship  between  administered  rates  and  market 
rates  changed.  As  interest  rates  rose  in  1972,  banks 
came  under  pressure  from  the  CID  to  moderate  their 
prime  rate  increases.  By  early  1973,  the  prime  rate 
was  held  artificially  below  the  commercial  paper  rate 
as  a  consequence  of  CID  policy.  Nonfinancial  firms 
substituted  short-term  bank  credit  for  funds  raised 
through  commercial  paper  issues.  Consequently  the 
volume  of  nonfinancial  commercial  paper  outstanding 
fell  sharply  during  the  first  and  second  quarters  of 
1973,  as  is  seen  in  Chart  1.  In  April  of  1973,  the 
CID  tried  to  stem  the  exodus  from  the  commercial 
paper  market  by  establishing  a  dual  prime  rate.  One 
rate  for  large  firms  moved  with  open  market  rates, 
while  the  other  for  smaller  firms  was  controlled. 
Despite  these  measures,  the  spread  between  commer- 
cial  paper  rates  and  the  prime  rate  persisted  and 
substitution  out  of  paper  continued.  In  the  fourth 
quarter  of  1973  CID  controls  were  removed  and  the 
commercial  paper  rate  dropped  below  the  prime  rate, 
causing  substantial  growth  in  commercial  paper. 
This  growth  continued  throughout  1975. 
The  1973-75  Period  The  recession  of  1973-75 
strained  the  paper  market  as  investors  became  in- 
creasingly  concerned  about  the  financial  strength  of 
commercial  paper  issuers.  Reflecting  this  concern, 
the  quality  rate  spread  (the  difference  between  the 
interest  rates  on  highest  quality  paper  and  medium 
quality  paper)  rose  from  about  12  basis  points  in 
January  1974  to  200  basis  points  in  November  of 
that  year.  Chart  2  shows  movements  in  the  quality 
spread  from  1974  to  1980.  Utility  companies  experi- 
enced  problems  selling  commercial  paper  as  their 
ratings  were  downgraded.  Real  Estate  Investments 
Trusts  (REITs)  were  another  group  to  encounter 
problems  in  the  commercial  paper  market.  Loan 
defaults  and  foreclosure  proceedings  early  in  the 
recession  led  to  financial  difficulties  and  resulted  in  a 
downgrading  of  REIT  paper.  As  a  result,  many 
REITs  and  utilities  were  forced  to  turn  to  bank 
credit. 
Bank  holding  companies  also  experienced  diffi- 
culty  issuing  commercial  paper  in  the  spring  of  1974. 
The  failure  of  Franklin  National  Bank  caused  wide- 
spread  concern  about  the  strength  of  other  banking 
organizations.  As  a  consequence,  smaller  bank  hold- 
ing  companies  in  particular  found  it  hard  to  place 
their  paper.  Nonetheless,  the  aggregate  volume  of 
outstanding  bank-related  commercial  paper  remained 
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relatively  unchanged  during  this  period  of  uncer- 
tainty.  In  general,  the  strongest  paper  issuers  with 
prime  ratings  sold  their  paper  without  problems 
during  the  1973-75  recession,  although  less  finan- 
cially  sound  issuers  had  to  pay  a  premium  to  acquire 
funds  in  the  commercial  paper  market. 
The  Late  1970s  After  the  1973-75  recession  the 
commercial  paper  market  grew  rapidly.  The  volume 
of  outstanding  nonfinancial  commercial  paper  ex- 
panded  at  a  31.9  percent  compound  annual  rate  from 
the  first  quarter  of  1976  to  the  first  quarter  of  1980. 
Over  the  same  period,  nonbank  financial  paper  grew 
at  a  20.1  percent  compound  annual  rate  and  bank- 
related  paper  at  a  27.9  percent  annual  rate.  The 
number  of  commercial  paper  issuers  increased  sub- 
stantially  as  well.  For  example,  issuers  rated  by 
Moody’s  Investor  Service  increased  from  516  at 
year-end  1975  to  881  at  year-end  1980. 
The  recent  rapid  growth  in  the  commercial  paper 
market  owes  much  to  the  secular  substitution  of 
short-term  for  long-term  debt,  which  accelerated  be- 
cause  of  the  high  rate  of  inflation  in  the  late  1970s. 
Volatile  interest  rates  due  to  uncertainty  about  the 
future  rate  of  inflation  make  firms  hesitant  to  struc- 
ture  their  balance  sheets  with  long-term,  fixed  rate 
assets  and  liabilities.  In  addition,  because  of  infla- 
tion’s  debilitating  effects  on  equity  markets,  debt  has 
grown  more  than  twice  as  fast  as  equity  during  the 
past  decade.  On  the  demand  side,  investors  also 
have  become  wary  of  long-term  fixed  rate  securities 
because  of  the  uncertainty  about  the  real  rate  of 
return  on  such  commitments  of  funds.  Therefore, 
funds  have  tended  to  flow  away  from  the  capital 
markets  and  into  the  money  markets.  A  large  share 
of  these  funds  have  been  channeled  into  the  commer- 
cial  paper  market. 
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quired  familiarity  with  open  market  finance  during 
the  1970s,  they  gradually  reduced  their  reliance  on 
short-term  bank  loans.  This  is  understandable  since 
use  of  open  market  funds  offers  the  potential  for 
substantial  savings  to  corporate  borrowers  compared 
to  the  cost  of  bank  credit.  Large  commercial  banks’ 
primary  source  of  funds  for,  financing  loans  is  the 
CD  market,  where  interest  rates  are  roughly  equal  to 
commercial  paper  rates.  In  addition,  the  cost  of 
funds  to  commercial  banks  includes  reserve  require- 
ments.6  Noninterest;  expenses  associated  with  lend- 
ing  also  add  to  the  cost  of  bank  operations.  These 
various  costs  drive  a wedge  between  open  market  and 
bank  lending  rates,  and  the  spread  between  the  prime 
rate  and  the  commercial  paper  rate  is  a  good  proxy 
for  the  difference  in  financing  costs  facing  companies 
that  need  funds. 
Large,  financially  sound  nonfinancial  firms,  there- 
fore,  have  relied  to  an  increasing  extent  on  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market  for  short-term  credit.  The 
ratio  of  nonfinancial  commercial  paper  to  commercial 
and  industrial  (C&I)  loans  at  large  commercial 
banks,  rose  from  about  11  percent  in  the  mid-1970s 
to  almost  25  percent  in  1980.  Chart  3  shows  the 
movements  in  the  ratio  of  paper  to  loans  from  1972 
to  1980. 
Banks  reacted  to  this  loss  of  market  share  by  be- 
coming  more  aggressive  in  pricing  loans.  Since 
1979,  for  example,  some  banks  have  begun  making 
loans  below  the  prime  rate.  In  a  Federal  Reserve 
Board  survey  of  48  large  banks,  the  percentage  of 
below  prime  loans  rose  from  about  20  percent  of  all 
commercial  loan  extensions  in  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1978  to  about  60  percent  by  the  second  quarter  of 
1980.  Most  of  these  loans  were  extended  at  rates 
determined  by  cost  of  funds  formulas.  In  addition, 
the  average  maturity  of  loans  over  $1  billion,  which 
make  up  almost  half  of  all  C&I  loans  in  volume,  fell 
from  about  3  months  in  1977  to  a  low  of  1.2  months 
in  August  1980.  Loans  below  prime  had  an  average 
maturity  of  well  under  one  month.  These  below 
prime  loans  were  in  the  same  maturity  range  as  the 
average  maturity  for  commercial  paper. 
Aside  from  becoming  more  competitive  with  the 
commercial  paper  market,  banks  have  tried  at  the 
6 The  following  example  illustrates  how  reserve  require- 
ments  on  CDs  increases  the  cost  of  funds  to  banks. 
Suppose  the  reserve  requirement  against  CDs  is  3  per- 
cent  and  a  bank’s  CD  offers  a  12  percent  yield.  Then 
for  every  dollar  obtained  through  the  CD,  only  97  cents 
are  available  to  lend.  The  funds  idled  as  reserves  increase 
the  effective  cost  of  funds  raised  by  issuing  a  CD.  In 
this  example,  the  additional  cost  imposed  by  the  reserve 
requirement  is  37 basis  points,  i.e.,  12  ÷  .97  =  12.37. 
same  time  to  provide  services  to  support  their  cus- 
tomers’  commercial  paper  issues.  Some  banks  have 
offered  customers  more  flexible  short-term  borrow- 
ing  arrangements  to  allow  commercial  paper  issuers 
to  adjust  the  timing  of  their  paper  sales.  Morgan 
Guaranty  Trust  Company,  which  originated  this  ser- 
vice,  calls  its  open  line  of  credit  a  “Commercial 
Paper  Adjustment  Facility”  and  prices  the  service 
below  the  prime  rate.  Commercial  banks  also  pro- 
vide  back-up  lines  of  credit  and  act  as  issuing  agents, 
as  discussed  above. 
In  summary,  competition  with  the  commercial 
paper  market  is  changing  the  lending  practices  of 
commercial  banks.  Although  banks  still  extend  a 
large  volume  of  short-term  business  loans,  the  profit- 
ability  of  loans  to  their  largest  customers  has  been 
reduced  partly  because  of  competition  with  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market,  and  some  commercial  bank 
activity  now  focuses  on  supporting  the  issuance  of 
their  customers’  commercial  paper. 
Financial  Paper  Since  the  1920s,  finance  com- 
panies  have  been  important  participants  in  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market.  They  provide  much  of  the 
credit  used  to  finance  consumer  purchases.  Histor- 
ically,  around  20  percent  of  outstanding  consumer 
credit  has  come  from  finance  companies.  Finance 
companies  also  supply  a  large  and  growing  amount 
of  business  credit  such  as  wholesale  and  retail  financ- 
ing  of  inventory,  receivables  financing,  and  commer- 
cial  and  leasing  financing.  About  half  of all  the  credit 
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predominantly  to  small-  and  medium-sized  firms. 
The  primary  source  of short-term  funds  for  finance 
companies  is  sales  of  commercial  paper.  In  fact,  the 
outstanding  commercial  paper  liabilities  of  finance 
companies  were  about  five  times  as  large  as  their 
bank  loans  in  the  late  1970s.  Like  nonfinancial 
companies,  finance  companies  since  the  mid-1960s 
gradually  increased  the  proportion  of  borrowing  in 
the  commercial  paper  market  compared  to  short-term 
borrowing  from  commercial  banks. 
As  seen  in  Chart  1,  nonbank  financial  paper  con- 
stitutes  the  largest  proportion  of  outstanding  com- 
mercial  paper.  Sixty  percent  of all  commercial  paper 
is  directly  placed  and  the  greatest  proportion  of  this 
is  finance  company  paper.  Finance  company  paper, 
however,  is  issued  by  only  a  small  fraction  of  the 
total  number  of  finance  companies.  According  to 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  Survey  of Finance  Com- 
panies,  1975, 88  of  the  largest  finance  companies  out 
of a  total  of  about  3,400  such  firms  issued  97  percent 
of all  finance  company  paper  and  extended  90  percent 
of  total  finance  company  credit. 
The  outstanding  volume  of  bank-related  financial 
paper  has  been  extremely  volatile  compared  to  non- 
bank  financial  paper.  As  mentioned  above,  this  mar- 
ket  received  a  major  jolt  when  the  Federal  Reserve 
imposed  reserve  requirements  on  bank-related  com- 
mercial  paper  issues  in  August  1970.  Growth  in  out- 
standing  bank-related  commercial  paper  resumed  by 
mid-1971,  however.  This  growth  corresponded  with 
record  acquisitions  of  nonbank  firms  by  bank  holding 
companies,  which  peaked  at  332  nonbank  firms  ac- 
quired  in  1973  and  264  firms  in  1974.  Some  of  the 
primary  activities  of  these  newly  acquired  subsidi- 
aries  are  commercial  finance,  factoring,  and  leasing. 
The  1973-75  recession  curtailed  the  growth  in  bank 
paper,  but  growth  resumed  its  upward  trend  by  1976 
and  has  continued  strongly  since. 
New  Directions  for  the  Commercial  Paper  Mar- 
ket  Recently  several  new  groups  of  issuers  have 
entered  the  commercial  paper  market.  These  include 
foreign  banks,  multinational  corporations,  and  public 
utilities;  thrift  institutions;  second  tier  issuers  rely- 
ing  on  guarantees  from  supporting  entities;  and  tax- 
exempt  issuers.  These  issuers  have  found  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market  to  be  a  flexible  and  attractive 
way  to  borrow  short-term  funds. 
Foreign  Issuers  Foreign  participation  in  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market  has  been  growing  and  will 
probably  continue  to  be  an  important  source  of  new 
growth.  As  of  year-end  1980,  Moody’s  rated  70 
foreign  issuers,  which  collectively  had  about  $7  billion 
in  outstanding  commercial  paper.  These  issuers  fall 
into  three  general  categories  :  foreign-based  multi- 
national  corporations,  nationalized  utilities,  and 
banks.  Some  large  foreign  multinational  corpora- 
tions  issue  paper  to  finance  their  operations  in  the 
United  States.  Others  borrow  to  support  a  variety 
of  activities  that  require  dollar  payments  for  goods 
and  services.  Nationalized  utilities  have  been  major 
borrowers  in  the  commercial  paper  market  largely 
because  their  purchases  of  oil  require  payment  in 
dollars.  Finally,  foreign  banks  raise  funds  for  their 
banking  activity  or  act  as  guarantors  for  the  commer- 
cial  paper  of  their  clients  by  issuing  letters  of  credit. 
These  banks  have  been  among  the  most  recent  en- 
trants  into  the  market. 
The  commercial  paper  market  is  often  the  cheapest 
source  of  dollars  for  foreign  issuers.  A  major  alter- 
native  source  of  dollar  borrowing  is  the  Eurodollar 
market,  where  rates  are  generally  linked  to  the  Lon- 
don  Interbank  Offered  Rate  (LIBOR).  Many  for- 
eign  banks,  for  example,  obtain  funds  in  the  commer- 
cial  paper  market  for ¼  percent  or  more  below 
LIBOR.  Aside  from  cost  considerations,  another 
important  motivation  behind  foreign  participation  in 
the  commercial  paper  market  is  foreign  issuers’  in- 
terest  in  obtaining  ratings  and  gaining  acceptance 
with  the  American  financial  community.  The  ex- 
posure  from  selling  paper  helps  to  broaden  a  foreign 
issuer’s  investor  base  and  prepares  the  way  for 
entering  the  bond  and  equity  markets. 
Two  obstacles  to  foreign  participation  in  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market  are  obtaining  prime  credit 
ratings  and  coping  with  foreign  withholding  taxes  on 
interest  paid  to  investors  outside  the  country.  Rat- 
ings  below  top  quality  wipe  out  the  cost  advantage  of 
raising  short-term  funds  in  the  commercial  paper 
market.  To  date,  for  example,  no  foreign  banks  have 
issued  paper  with  less  than  top  ratings. 
Withholding  taxes  on  interest  paid  to  investors 
outside  the  country  also  may  eliminate  commercial 
paper’s  cost  advantage  over  the  Eurodollar  market. 
These  taxes  are  intended  to  curtail  short-term  capital 
outflows  and  are  used  in  France,  Belgium,  Australia, 
Canada,  and  other  countries.  For  foreign  issuers’ 
commercial  paper  to  be  marketable,  the  issuer  must 
bear  the  cost  of  the  withholding  tax.  The  tax  there- 
fore  raises  the  cost  of  acquiring  funds  using  commer- 
cial  paper. 
By  taking  advantage  of  loopholes  and  technicalities 
in  the  withholding  tax  laws,  foreign  issuers  often 
circumvent  these  laws.  For  example,  the  nationalized 
French  electric  company,  Electricite  de  France,  one 
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its  commercial  paper  classified  as  long-term  debt, 
which  is  not  subject  to  France’s  15 percent  withhold- 
ing  tax  on  interest.  The  reason  for  this  classification 
is  that  the  utility  backs  its  paper  with  a  lo-year 
revolving  credit  facility  from  its  banks  that  establishes 
the  commercial  paper  borrowing  as  long-term  debt. 
French  banks  use  a  different  approach  to  take  ad- 
vantage  of  a  withholding  tax  exemption  on  short- 
term  time  deposits  like  CDs.  They  set  up  U.  S. 
subsidiaries  to  sell  commercial  paper  and  then  trans- 
fer  the  proceeds  to  the  French  parent  banks  by  issu- 
ing  CDs  to  their  U.  S.  subsidiaries. 
In  general,  foreign  issuers  pay  more  to  borrow  in 
the  commercial  paper  market  than  domestic  issuers 
for  two  reasons.  First,  almost  all  foreign  commercial 
paper  issues  have  a  sovereign  risk  associated  with 
the  issuer  that  results  from  additional  uncertainty  in 
the  investor’s  mind  about  the  probability  of  default 
on  commercial  paper  because  of  government  inter- 
vention,  political  turmoil,  economic  disruption,  etc. 
This  uncertainty  creates  a  risk  premium  which  in- 
creases  the  interest  rate  on  foreign  issues  relative  to 
domestic  issues.  The  size  of  the  premium  depends  on 
the  issuer,  the  country,  and  the  level  of  interest  rates. 
A  second  source  of  additional  costs  arises  when  for- 
eign  issuers  pay  to  establish  and  operate  U.  S.  sub- 
sidiaries  to  issue  paper  and,  in  the  case  of  foreign 
banks,  incur  reserve  requirement  costs  on  commercial 
paper  issues.  In  addition,  rating  service  fees  are 
higher  for  foreign  issuers  than  for  domestic  issuers, 
as  mentioned  earlier.  Nevertheless,  the  commercial 
paper  market  is  proving  to  be  the  least  expensive 
source  of  short-term  dollar  funds  for  an  increasing 
number  of  foreign  borrowers. 
Thrift  Commercial  Paper  Both  savings  and  loan 
associations  and  mutual  savings  banks  have  recently 
been  allowed  to  borrow  funds  in  the  commercial 
paper  market.  Mutual  savings  banks  (MSBs)  had 
the  authority  to  issue  commercial  paper,  but  faced 
restrictions  on  advertising,  interest  payments,  and 
minimum  maturity  that  effectively  prevented  them 
from  issuing  commercial  paper.  On  March  3,  1980 
the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (FDIC) 
removed  the  restrictions  and  thereby  cleared  the  way 
for  MSB  participation  in  the  commercial  paper  mar- 
ket.  The  FDIC  ruled  that  MSB  commercial  paper 
must  be  unsecured,  have  a  maximum  maturity  of 
nine  months,  sell,  at  a  minimum  price  of  $100,000, 
state  that  it  is  uninsured  by  FDIC,  and  bear  a  notice 
that  the  instrument  will  pay  no  interest  after  ma- 
turity.  Despite  the  relaxation  of  restrictions,  as  of 
early  1981  no  MSBs  have  issued  paper.  The  failure 
of  MSBs  to  issue  commercial  paper  has  been  largely 
due  to  impaired  MSB  earnings,  which  make  it  diffi- 
cult  to  obtain  the  high  credit  ratings  necessary  to 
realize  the  cost  advantage  in  borrowing  in  the  com- 
mercial  paper  market. 
Savings  and  loan  associations  have  had  access  to 
the  commercial  paper  market  since  January  1979, 
when  the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  approved 
the  first  applications  for  S&Ls  to  issue  commercial 
paper  and  short-term  notes  secured  by  mortgage 
loans.  S&Ls  use  commercial  paper  principally  to 
finance  seasonal  surges  in  loan  demand  and  to  finance 
secondary  mortgage  market  operations.  Commercial 
paper  allows  greater  flexibility  for  S&Ls  in  managing 
liquidity  because  they  can  borrow  large  amounts  of 
cash  quickly  and  for  periods  as  short  as  five  days. 
Relatively  few  S&Ls  carry  commercial  paper  ratings. 
Of  the  60  or  so  large  S&Ls  expected  to  participate  in 
the,  market  after  the  FHLBB  approved  the  first 
applications,  only  12 had  ratings  from  Moody’s  as  of 
mid-1980,  though  all  were  P-l.  These  S&Ls  collec- 
tively  had  $327  million  in  outstanding  commercial 
paper  as  of  mid-1980. 
The  attractiveness  of  commercial  paper  for  S&Ls 
and  MSBs  has  been  sharply  diminished  as  a  result 
of  the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980.  Under  the 
Act,  commercial  paper  is  considered  a  reservable 
liability,  except  when  issued  to  certain  exempt  in- 
vestors  such  as  depository  institutions.  S&Ls  and 
MSBs  have  to  hold  reserves  in  the  ratio  of  3 percent 
against  outstanding  commercial  paper,  which  is  clas- 
sified  as  a nonpersonal  time  deposit.  Reserve  require- 
ments  increase  the  cost  of  funds  raised  through  com- 
mercial  paper  and  consequently  reduce  the  incentive 
for  S&Ls  and  MSBs  to  issue  paper. 
Support  Arrangements  Many  lesser  known  firms 
gain  access  to  the  commercial  paper  market  through 
financial  support  arrangements  obtained  from  firms 
with  the  highest  credit  ratings.  Second  tier  issuers 
frequently  issue  paper  by  obtaining  a  letter  of  credit 
from  a  commercial  bank.  This  procedure  substitutes 
the  credit  of  a bank  for  that  of  the  issuer  and  thereby 
reduces  the  cost  of  issuing  commercial  paper.  This 
kind  of  support  arrangement  is  known  as  “commer- 
cial  paper  supported  by  letter  of  credit”  and  re- 
sembles  bankers’  acceptance  financing  except  that  the 
issuance  of  commercial  paper  is  not  associated  with 
the  shipment  of goods.  Because  the  letter  of  credit  is 
appended  to  the,  commercial  paper  note,  commercial 
paper  supported  by  letter  of  credit  is  alternatively 
referred  to  as  a  “documented  discount  note.”  Typi- 
cally,  letters  of  credit  are  valid  for  a  specific  term  or 
are  subject  to  termination  upon  written  notice  by 
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ready  to  back  up  an  issue  of  paper,  an  issuer  must 
pay  a  fee  that  ranges  from  one-quarter  to  three- 
quarters  of  a  percentage  point. 
Although  commercial  paper  with  letter  of  credit 
support  reached  an  outstanding  volume  of  about  $2 
billion  by  mid-1980,  this  segment  of  the  market  is 
still  comparatively  small.  Many  issuers  of  letter  of 
credit  commercial  paper  are  subsidiaries  of  larger 
corporate  entities.  These  second  tier  issuers  include 
firms  involved  in  pipeline  construction,  vehicle  leas- 
ing,  nuclear  fuel  supply,  and  power  plant  construc- 
tion.  Other  commercial  paper  issuers  also  have 
acquired  letter  of  credit  support  from  commercial 
banks,  particularly  during  the  period  of  restricted 
credit  growth  in  early  1980.  Issuers  whose  ratings 
were  downgraded  faced  difficulty  selling  their  paper 
and  paid  substantial  premiums  over  high  grade  paper. 
Buying  a  letter  of  credit  from  a  commercial  bank 
reduced  their  borrowing  costs  in  the  commercial 
paper  market  and  still  offered  a  cheaper  alternative 
to  short-term  bank  loans. 
Other  supporting  entities  that  provide  guarantees 
or  endorsements  are  insurance  companies,  govern- 
ments  for  government-owned  companies,  and  parent 
companies  for  their  subsidiaries.  For  example,  the 
commercial  paper  of  the  nationalized  French  utilities, 
such  as  Electricite  de  France,  carries  the  guarantee 
of  the  Republic  of  France.  Guarantees  or  endorse- 
ments  by  parent  companies  for  their  subsidiaries  are 
the  most  prevalent  form  of  support  arrangement, 
Tax-Exempt  Paper  One  of  the  most  recent  inno- 
vations  in  the  commercial  paper  market  is  tax-exempt 
paper.  Except  for  its  tax-exempt  feature,  this  paper 
differs  little  from  other  commercial  paper.  To  qualify 
for  tax-exempt  status  the  paper  must  be  issued  by 
state  or  municipal  governments,  or  by  qualified  non- 
profit  organizations.  Like  taxable  commercial  paper, 
tax-exempt  paper  is  also  exempt  from  Securities  and 
Exchange  Commission  registration  provided  the 
paper  matures  within  270  days.  Most  tax-exempt 
paper  matures  within  15  to  90  days.  These  short- 
term  debt  obligations  are  alternatively  known  as 
short-term  revenue  bonds  or  short-term  interim  cer- 
tificates. 
The  outstanding  volume  of  tax-exempt  paper  has 
grown  rapidly,  rising  from  an  insignificant  amount 
in  1979  to  about  $500  million  in  1980.  It  will  prob- 
ably  exceed  $1  billion  in  1981.  Much  of  the  demand 
for  tax-exempt  paper  comes  from  short-term  tax- 
exempt  funds,  which  had  assets  of  $1.5  billion  in 
mid-1980,  and  from  bank  trust  departments.  Many 
mutual  fund  groups  are  setting  up  tax-exempt  money 
market  funds  in  response  to  the  apparent  increasing 
demand  for  this  type  of  investment.  A  current  short- 
age  of  tax-exempt  commercial  paper  has  depressed 
the  yields  on  outstanding  issues,  making  this  instru- 
ment  especially  attractive  to  tax-exempt  issuers. 
However,  constraints  on  public  agency  use  of  short- 
term  debt  in  some  states  may  continue  to  limit  the 
supply  of  tax-exempt  commercial  paper. 
Conclusion  The  commercial  paper  market  has 
served  the  short-term  financing  needs  of  several 
groups  of borrowers  to  an  increasing  degree  in  recent 
years.  Many  nonfinancial  companies,  especially  large 
firms,  have  substituted  commercial  paper  for  short- 
term  bank  loans  to  satisfy  their  working  capital  re- 
quirements.  Commercial  paper  has  generally  been  a 
less  costly  financing  alternative  than  bank  short-term 
credit  for  these  firms.  Finance  companies  have  relied 
to  a  greater  extent  on  commercial  paper  than  nonfi- 
nancial  companies  for  short-term  financing  and  have 
issued  the  greatest  proportion  of  outstanding  com- 
mercial  paper.  Most  large  finance  companies  realize 
economies  of  scale  by  placing  commercial  paper  di- 
rectly  with  investors.  Bank  holding  companies  also 
have  depended  on  the  paper  market  to  finance  their 
banking-related  activities,  which  increased  in  size  and 
scope  during  the  1970s. 
Other  types  of  issuers  have  been  recently  attracted 
to  the  commercial  paper  market  because  of  the  po- 
tential  saving  in  interest  costs  over  alternative  ways 
of borrowing  short-term  funds.  Foreign  issuers  have 
sold  a  substantial  amount  of  commercial  paper  since 
entering  the  market  in  the  mid-1970s.  Foreign  and 
domestic  issuers  who  lack  sufficient  financial  strength 
to  offer  commercial  paper  on  their  own  have  gained 
access  to  the  market  via  support  arrangements  with 
stronger  financial  or  corporate  entities.  Tax-exempt 
issuers  are  expected  to  increase  in  number  and  gen- 
erate  larger  supplies  of  tax-exempt  paper.  Thrift 
institutions,  on  the  other  hand,  probably  will  not 
make  much  use  of the  market  in  the  future  because 
recently  imposed  reserve  requirements  on  commercial 
paper  have  reduced  its  cost-advantage  over  other 
sources  of  short-term  credit. 
Many  investors  find  commercial  paper  to  be  an 
attractive  short-term  financial  instrument.  Although 
corporations  and  other  institutional  investors  held 
most  outstanding  commercial  paper  in  the  past,  finan- 
cial  intermediation  by  money  market  funds  and  other 
short-term  investment  pooling  arrangements  has 
given  many  new  investors,  especially  individuals,  in- 
direct  access  to  commercial  paper. 
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